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LABOR MOBILIZATION IN THE NATIONAL
SOCIALIST NEW ORDER
FRANZ NEUMANN*
The white race can maintain its position in practice only if the differences in the
living standards in the world are retained. Give to our so-called export markets the
same living standards that we have, and you will find that the preponderance of the
white race, which is expressed not only in the political might of the nation but also in
the economic position of the individual, can no longer be retained.
Thus spoke Adolf Hitler to an audience of Rhineland industrialists on January
27, x932-one year before he came to power.' In October, 1941, Ernst Poensgen,
president of the United Steel Trust, celebrated his seventieth birthday. On behalf
of Adolf Hitler, the Minister of Economic Affairs presented him with the Order
of the Eagle accompanying the presentation with the following speech:
With the overthrow of bolshevism and the development of the vast Eastern European
continent, entirely new and extremely favorable prospects for German business will be
opened up. This applies also to the German iron industry. This expansion also offers
possibilities for a revision, long overdue, of price and profit policy in the coal and iron
industries....2
Better than the many ideological treatises on Lebensraum, geo-politics and racial-
ism, these two statements reveal the kernel of the National Socialist doctrine: it is
the old German imperialism with new methods, new techniques and new ideologies.
It aims at subjecting Europe to the total economic control of German industry and
reserving the exploitation of that vast continent exclusively for German masters.
But economic exploitation by economic means alone, or by the methods of liberal
democracy, or even of Wilhelminian absolutism, is nolonger possible.
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Both the domestic situation and the political structure of Europe made it im-
possible to maintain total economic supremacy without corresponding total political
supremacy. Internal conditions made it impossible since the German people were
unwilling to resort to aggressive war in order to establish their supremacy 3 War
today is total war, requiring the total organization of society even in times of peace.
Even the legal distinction between war and peace is being slowly abandoned. Peace
seems merely a preparatory period of war. A total organization of' society for
aggressive war cannot be achieved within the framework of political democracy.
This is the view of General Ludendorff as of J. A. Hobson. 4 Nor can war today
be organized by mere absolutism, that is, by the establishment of a central economic
machinery independent of the social forces underlying it. Total war requires total
ideological, economic, social, and military organization of society; it makes neces-
sary the complete control of every aspect of social and private life. This, obviously,
cannot be achieved by a bureaucracy which, to be effective everywhere, would have
to expand to an unprecedented size. In consequence, a number of mechanisms
have to be built up: business organizations for the complete control of business;
the military machine; the civil services for the swift and efficient execution of the
commands of the top leadership; and a monolithic party for "Menschenfiihrung"--
for the indoctrination and manipulation of the masses of the people.
Hitler's Duisseldorf speech of 1932 contains the kernel of the doctrine of racial
imperialism,5 that is, of the theory that the present war is a war of a proletarian
race against plutocratic democracies, a doctrine that was fully developed by the
Italian nationalist Enrico Corradini during the Turkish-Italian conflict. It is un-
doubtedly the most genuine and the most dangerous manifestation of the National
Socialist spirit.
This doctrine makes the war a paying proposition for the German people. It
is not mere propaganda. It is even now a reality. German propaganda is never
mere propaganda, it is always action and propaganda. In almost every case it con-
tains a token fulfillment of its promises. National Socialists do not content them-
selves with making anti-Semitic propaganda, they actually exterminate the Jew;
they do not revile liberalism and democracy, they actually annihilate them; not
only do they call themselves a proletarian race engaged in struggle with plutocratic
nations-but, even during the war, begin to carry out the promises of their propa-
ganda Indeed, many groups in German society have actually profited from for-
3 Cf. BEHEMOTH 185-186. 'See BEamrOTH 185.
'On the evolution of the doctrine, see BEHEMOTH 184-218.
I This insight into the intrinsic connection between National Socialist propaganda and action should,
rightly understood, make two things clear. First: No German victory has been won by propaganda;
neither the destruction of democracy in Germany, nor the defeat of France are the work of superior
propaganda techniques. Second: No mere propaganda of the Allied powers against Germany will have
the slightest success unless such propaganda is backed by the beginning of performance. I cannot here
dwell upon this important problem. The author has, in cooperation with Dr. Norbert Guterman, pre-
pared a memorandum in which the principles of our psychological offensive against Germany are
explained.
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eign conquests. The party with its Hermann G~ring combine and its Wilhelm
Gustloff Foundation, its Labor Front business organizations, 7 has incorporated many
industrial, commercial and banking enterprises into its own organizations. Big
business has swallowed enormous slices of foreign enterprises in the process of
Germanization! Thousands of new positions have been created in the occupied
territories filled from the rank of the party officials, thus from the middle classes
whose economic independence has been destroyed by the process of monopolization
which is the decisive feature of the structural changes in German economy.
All these groups have indeed benefited. They are tied to the party and to the
military machine by bonds of gold. They are, thereby, also bound to the regime
by a collective guilt: the spoliation of the conquered lands by army, party, bureau-
cracy, and big business makes every one of them a partner in a conspiracy; each
of them shares the guilt of a ruthless and immoral conqueror. They must stick
together to the bitter end, hoping to avert disaster by maintaining unity.
We have not mentioned the working classes, workers and salaried employees.
Do they actively share in the process of spoliation? Are they members of the
master race that maintains and even improves its status at the expense of the masses
in the conquered territories? Or are they victims of an exploiting machine that
subjects them to terror equally with the masses in the conquered countries?
This is the crucial question. It is crucial for the understanding of the origin,
nature and aims of National Socialism; the answer to it must determine the char-
acter of our psychological offensive against Germany and of the peace that we
want to make. The significance of the problem is well realized by National
Socialists. Slogans such as "plant community," "people's community" and "anti-
plutocratic struggle" are designed to capture the working classes. Yet it is pre-
cisely on this point that the National Socialist regime offers only propaganda-
nothing else.
The German worker or salaried employee has received nothing from the regime
except promises of a better future. He had, it is true, obtained security before the
outbreak of the war. Full employment was the only achievement of the National
Socialists. Yet that security is extremely ambiguous. It has paved the way for the
utmost physical insecurity, namely for death. Those workers who did not know
it before, know it since 1939: that economic security under National Socialism was
possible only as a prelude to death. Death in the trenches, death in air raids,
death in the factories as. a result of physical exhaustion, death in railroad yards,
chemical factories, and the like as a result of a terrific increase in industrial acci-
dents. The connection between economic security and death is not incidental, it
is essential; it springs from the very nature of National Socialism, which is an
aggressive imperialist system seeking to transform markets into colonies.
How then have the working classes been integrated into the National Socialist
'See the detailed discussion in BHEmoTH 298-305.
11d. I8O-i84, 275-277, 386-388, 396-398.
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system? Certainly not by voluntary collaboration with the regime. Even if the
working classes wanted to collaborate actively, they could not do so since "they are
the only groups in society that do not possess organizations of their own and thus
have no means of articulating either acceptance or rejection of the regime. The
German Labor Front is-as we shall see-neither a trade union nor a substitute
for it. It is entirely a terroristic agency of the party. Psychologically, the attitude
of the workers may be described as one of passive acceptance of National Socialism,
a passivity produced by the ideological and organizational collapse of the trade
unions and of the working class parties, by the severe unemployment from 193o to
1933, and by the suicidal policy of the Weimar Republic. Economically, the system
makes use of the oldest capitalistic incentives to increase production, viz., what is
called in Germany "Leistungslohn"--"performance wage"--a combination of time
and piecework where piecework elements predominate over time elements, a kind
of streamlined Bedaux system with universal application-even to juveniles. So-
cially the work is incorporated into the system by terror, a terror as subtle as the
system itself, by the destruction of rational, hence calculable, relations and their
replacement by the unexpected.
The following discussion will deal with the control of labor not only in Ger-
many, but in the occupied territories as well. It will be based exclusively on Ger-
man materials. Some of the materials are already discussed in my book, "Be-
hemoth," but this article will supply many additional data that have heretofore not
been discussed.
I. THE GERMAN LABOR SUPPLY
For an understanding of the magnitude of the problems of labor control in
Germany, some data on the composition of its working population are necessary."
Of the total population in 1939 of 79,400,000, approximately 39,800,000 (50.1/)
were gainfully employed. The gainfully employed group was composed of
24,900,000 men (64.1% of the male population) and 14,900,000 women (36.7 / of
the female population). In the old Reich territory with a total population of
68,128,000, IS% were engaged in agriculture and forestry; 41%, in industry and
handicrafts; 15.8%, in commerce and transportation; and io.i%, in public and
private services. Household service accounted for 2.1% and the remainder, i3%,
were classed as "independents without occupation."10  Such is the normal picture
of a highly industrialized, highly monopolized, and highly bureaucratic society.
In the period 1933-1939 there had been a sharp increase (34.2%) in the total
number engaged in public and private services, much smaller increases in industry
' The discussion is based on the results of the 1939 Census, as published in (941) WIRTsCHAFr TJND
STATISTix, No. 2; (1941) id. No. 3; (941) 50 SoziALE P Axis, Nos. 2, 8. The territory comprises
the former German Reich, Austria (called "Ostmark") and the Sudetenland.
"oThese are essentially recipients of annuities, pensioners, persons living on their own capital, or
persons supported by others not members of their households. STATiSrCH rS JAm.BuCH F. D. DEUrsCe
REICH (1938) 24n.
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(8.6%) and in domestic services (7.8%), and declines in agriculture and forestry
(io.6%) and in commerce and transportation (3.70/.). Independents without occu-
pation also declined 1.2%. Of the gainfully employed (including their families),
7% in 1939 were civil servants, 13% were salaried employees, and 52.8% were wage-
earners. These groups had increased by o2%, 17.1%, and 6.6%, respectively, in
the period between 1933 and 1939 while the total occupied population was increas-
ing by 3.9%.
In the boom year 1929 the total number of wage-earners and salaried employees
actually employed was 17,870,000. In January, 1941, this total had risen to an esti-
mated 22,670,000 (14,250,000 men, 8,42oooo women),"' to whom about 2,oo,ooo
foreign civilian workers should be added. 12 In February, 1942, approximately
24,000,000 (15,000,000 men and 9,400,000 women) were at work. To these should
be added an unknown number of war prisoners, of whom there were 1,400,ooo by
April 1, 1941, all Polish or French. 1 This increment has brought the total to about
27,000,000.
The consideration of the problem of mobilizing this vast labor force may be
organized under the following heads:
The institutional arrangements for controlling the labor market.
The devices used for increasing and distributing the labor supply.
The probable consequences of the National Socialist labor policy for the future
development of Germany and Europe.
II. THE CONTROL OF THE LABOR MARKET
We are not concerned with the stages of German policy regarding the control
of the labor supply. We may, with the German authority in the field,14 distinguish
four such stages and add a fifth:
(i) the general struggle against mass unemployment,'r which has been carried
out primarily by pump priming and public works;
"x (941) 50 SoziarE PAms, No. 5, p. x99; BEHEMOrH 508-509.
"
2 The latest detailed analysis, as of Sept. ig, 1941, based on official German sources, is contained
in I. T. F. BULL. No. 4, Feb. 5, 1942. It is as follows:
Poland .......................... 1,007,531 France ............................ 48,567
Italy ..... ........................ 271,667 Hungary ........................... 34,990
Protectorate ......................... 140,052 Denmark .......................... 28,895
Belgium ............................ 121,501 Bulgaria ............................ 14,578
Yugoslavia .......................... 108,791 Miscellaneous ....................... 189,919
Holland ............................ 92,995
Slovakia ........................... 80,037 Total ............................ 2,139,553
All the figures, with the possible exception of the Protectorate whose labor supply seems to be exhausted,
have considerably increased during the past few months.
1 12 WmTscHA'r UND STATsTIK (1941) oo; Frankfurter Zeitung, Aug. so, 1941.
14F. Syrup (President of the Reich Institute for Labor Exchange and Unemployment Insurance
and Secretary of State in the Ministry of Labor), Die Etappen des Arbeitseinsatzes (1939) 48 SOZIALE
PiAxis, No. 1, p. 7; SYRUP, ZEHN jAnRE REICHSANSTALT FUR ARBEITSVERmirrLUNo uUD ARBEITSLOSEN-
VERSICIERUNG 1927-1937 (Berlin, 1937).
" This aspect of Germany's efforts is very well presented by Leo Grebler, Work Creation Policy in
Germany 1932-1935 (1937) 35 INT. LAB. REv. 331-351, 505-527.
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(2) the control of the utilization of the unemployed in 1934 and 1935 with its
Act of May 15, 1934, for the Regulation of Labor Supply'6 and its Decree of
August io, 1934, on the Distribution of Labor Forces; 1
(3) the beginning of labor scarcity and the control of the natural fluctuations
of labor-especially in the many regulations of November 7, 1936, issued under the
authority of the Four-Year-Plan Decree and discussed herein;
(4) the securing of adequate labor supply for tasks of major political significance
on the basis of the decree of June 22, I938;' and we may add
(5) the complete control of the labor supply in all its aspects with the'outbreak
of the war by the decree of September i, 1939, of the Ministerial Council for the
Defense of the Reich."0
We shall not dwell on the first phase, but concentrate on the policy during the
preparedness and war periods.
The institutions responsible for the increase and distribution of labor supply and
the increase of labor productivity are (I) state organs, namely, (a) the labor ex-
changes directed by the Ministry of Labor, and (b) the Trustees of Labor, Labor
Courts, and Social Courts of Honor; (2) party organs, namely, the Labor Front,
the Councils of Trusted Men, the plant troops and political shock troops; and (3)
a combination of both, namely, the general deputy for labor supply, the "combing-
out" commissions and party district leaders. We shall devote our attention to each of
these institutions in turn.
I (a). The Labor Exchanges
Up to the spring of 1942, the total power over the labor supply was vested in
the Ministry of Labor acting through its executive machinery, the provincial and
local labor exchanges, originally organs of the Reich Institute for Labor Exchange
and Unemployment Insurance established by the Act of July i6, i927. 0 The Reich
Institute was a semi-autonomous institution, comprising a main office, 13 provincial
labor exchanges, and 345 local labor exchanges. 2' The composition of these bodies
follows the principle of a democratic and pluralistic collectivism prevalent under
the Wcimar Republic. They comprised representatives of trade unions, employers,
associations, and public authorities controlled by the Minister of Labor. The Reich
Institute performed-as its name indicates-a dual function: (I) it raised contri-
butions for unemployment insurance, administered the funds and provided for in-
surance; and (2) it organized employment service. However, it had no monopoly
in this. Although private labor exchanges conducted on a business basis were
' R IcHsorUErzDLA'rr (hereinafter referred to as "R. G. BL.") pt. I, 381.
"Id. 786. Both devices will be discussed below.
" Id. 652, discussed below, together with the later Decree of Feb. 13, 1939.
"Id. 1685. "' Id. 187, later amended.
" At present there are 23 provincial (state) and 468 local employment offices. See Beisiegel, Labor
Redistriution in Germany (1942) INT. LAB. REv. No. 4, P. 400.
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prohibited as of January i, i93i, by the order of April 28, 1923,22 and the commercial
agencies indemnified, non-profit organizations (except political organizations) such
as employers associations, trade unions, and religious and charitable bodies could
still act as labor exchanges. Moreover the employer could hire labor by whatever
means he thought fit; he could advertise or utilize non-profit organizations or his
own personnel department. The trade union demand for a state monopoly of
labor exchange failed of realization under the Weimar Republic.
The changes under National Socialism affected, of course, the composition of
the agencies of the Reich Institute and do not concern us here. However, the
increasing necessity for close centralization of the control of labor soon led to a
complete organizational change. The main office of the Reich Institute was trans-
formed into a "Reichsstock far Arbeitseinsatz," a Reich Fund for Labor Supply,2"
ie., a fund that merely administers the contributions paid by employers and em-
ployees (6Y2% together) and defrays the costs of the labor supply administration.
The executive offices, the provincial labor exchanges and labor exchanges, have
ceased to be the agents of the Reich Institute and have become direct executive
agents of the Ministry of Labor.F4
Shortly afterwards (August 1, 1939) the labor exchanges were also made agencies
of the Trustees of Labor with whose tasks we shall deal later. The Trustees, to
cope with the increasing amount of their work, had established branch offices
which were dissolved in 1939, and their functions are now performed by the labor
exchanges, now numbering 468 and staffed by about 45,000 employees.25
i(b). The Trustees of Labor, Labor Courts, and Social Courts of Honor
The power to regulate wages and labor conditions is vested exclusively in the
Reich Trustees of Labor as provided for in the Act of January 20, 1934, for the
Regulation of National Labor," the so-called Charter of Labor. The rights of the
Trustees of Labor may be grouped under the following heads: (a) they cooperate
in the establishment, operation and dismissal of the Councils of Trusted Men;
(b) they decide upon mass dismissals; (c) they participate in proceedings before
the Social Courts of Honor; (d) they supervise the execution of plant regulations;
(e) they enact and supervise wage regulations (Tarifordnungen); and (f) they
report to the Ministry of Labor. The Trustees of Labor are thus the successors,
so to speak, of the collective agreements between employers or employers associa-
tions and trade unions.
2' (x923) REICHSARBEITSBLA-rr 284, later amended by Decree of Sept. 28, 1927, R. G. 1L. pt. 1, 318,
and then incorporated in §55 of the Act of July x6, 1927.2 Dr. Zschucke in i PossE, SYRup, LANDFRIED, BACKE, ALLPERSw, KOMMENTAR ZUR REICHsvERTEPI-
GUNGSGESETZGEBUNG (hereinafter referred to as "PossE ET AL., KOMMENTR") (Munich & Berlin, 1939)
pt. 1H, Arbeidslosenhilfe, 2.
24 (1939) 48 SOZIALE PRAxss, No. x5, p. 95O. 1 Ibd. See also Beisiegel, supra note 2x.
, R. G. BL. pt. I, 45. A corresponding statute was enacted on March 23, 1934, for workers and sal-
aried employees (not Civil servants) in public administrations and certain publicly owned enterprises
(utilities). Id. 220.
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Yet there exist a number of differences. The provisions of the collective agree-
ments normally affected labor contracts only if both parties to the labor contracts
were members of the bargaining associations," though collective agreements might
be extended to outsiders by an award of the Minister of Labor on application of
a bargaining association. The wage orders of the Trustees, however, automatically
affect all employers and employees of a designated industry or craft in a specific
region. Still more important is a second distinction. Under the Republic, the
collective agreement had precedence over a plant agreement concluded between the
employer and the work council. 8 It is in this provision that the collective character
of republican labor relations was most strongly expressed. The Charter of Labor
has reversed the relation between plant regulation and wage regulation. Accord-
ing to Section 32, the Trustee of Labor shall issue general wage regulations for "a
group of plants" only if such regulations are urgently needed for the protection
of the employed. The Charter of Labor thus conceived of plant regulation and
individual bargaining as the normal type of labor control, thereby expressing the
one fundamental principle of National Socialist methods of mass manipulation:
to destroy whatever affinities common work creates and to manipulate the working
class by their thorough atomization. 9  In practice, however, the demands of a
highly rationalized and industrialized society proved stronger than the ideas of the
Charter of Labor. Even a slight perusal of the Reichsarbeitsblatt, the official period-
ical of the Ministry of Labor which contains all the regulations of the Trustees of
Labor, shows that supra-plant regulation absolutely predominates over plant reg-
ulation. However, again a word of warning is necessary. According to the
fourteenth administrative order3" under the Charter of Labor, the Trustees of
Labor may exempt "specific plants or divisions of plants or specific followers 3'
(i.e., workers and salaried employees) from all or some provisions of their wage
regulations. These exemptions need not be published in the Reichsarbeitsblatt-so
that even the statistics of hourly earnings according to wage regulations lose much
of their importance.
Gradually, the powers of the Trustees have been freed from the fetters of rational
law. The development tended to transform the minimum wage regulation into
maximum wage rules. The first basic enactment to this effect was the Decree of
June 25, 1938, for the Establishment of Wages.3 2 It again gave the Trustees
27 Tarifvertragsordnung, Dec. 23, 1918, as re-enacted March 1, 1928, R. G. BL. pt. I, 47.
" Work Council Act of Feb. 4, 1920, §8, R. G. BL. pt. I, 147.
" On the principle of mass manipulation, cf. BEHEMoTH 400-403.
" German laws, normally "passed" by Hitler alone or jointly with any or all Reich Ministers,
usually contain authorizations to one or more officials (as a rule, the ministers concerned) to regulate
all details of the enactment by order ("Rechtsverordnungen und allgemeine Verwaltungsvorschriften" or
"Durchfiihrungsvorschriften"). Actually, of course, the laws delegate legislative authority. The regula-
tions issued in pursuance of such delegated authority are here translated by the term "administrative
order." The term "act" or "decree" is used to refer to the delegating legislation.
" Order of Oct. 15, 1935, R. G.. BL. pt. I, 1240.
'2 R. G. BL. pt. I, 691, issued in pursuance of the Four-Year-Plan Decree.
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authority to supervise the wages and labor conditions, to enact such measures as
are necessary to prevent any injury to the execution of the Four Year Plan, and to
fix maximum wages even by interfering with existing plant regulations and labor
contracts. Such maximum wages were fixed in the two branches most affected by
labor scarcity, building construction and metal industries, so as to prevent the pirat-
ing of labor. The Decree of June 25, 1938, had but little success. Moreover, it
did not interfere with acquired rights and still restricted the Trustees to the enact-
ment of general regulations!3
These powers were added during the war. The Decree of September x, 1939,"
enabled the Trustees to enact wage regulations for individual plants, to dispense
with consultation with the committee of experts (for which the Charter of Labor
had provided), that is, to speed up the process of wage regulations and to differ-
entiate as finely as necessary even within each industry or craft. The War Economy
Decree of September 4, I939,a" has finally removed all remaining fetters.
It authorizes the Trustees, on the basis of orders from the Minister of Labor,
"to adjust at once the earnings to the conditions of war and to fix maximum wages,
salaries and other labor conditions by wage regulation." The Decree thus interferes
with acquired rights-no matter whether derived from statutes, wage regulations,
plant regulations, or individual labor contracts. If, for instance, a plant must be
closed down as a result of the war, the Trustee is empowered to dispense with or
shorten the dismissal period, however established.3 1 Savings that accrue to the
employer must be delivered to the federal tax offices.3 7
Yet, the same War Economy Decree 8s also restricted the powers of the Trustees
by freezing wages, salaries, and all other remuneration. The prohibition to raise
the compensation of labor includes piecework, and is ruthlessly enforced8 But
the wage freezing seriously lessens the one incentive on which the regime has
relied to raise the productivity of labor: the "performance wage" which has been
applied even in the case of juvenile workers.4° To exempt anyone from the wage-
freezing order in order to stimulate production would have meant to sacrifice the
very principle upon which the social and economic policy of the war regime rests.
It would have unfettered a serious competition for manpower among the business
" Some trustees apparently believed that the Decree of June 25, 1938, authorized them to interfere
with specific labor contracts. One such case is reported by Meissinger, (1938) DER DzuTScsta VoLxSwlwr
No. 46. The problem is discussed by Lutz Richter, Zurn 4ulgabenkreis des Reichstreuhanders (3938)
47 SOZrALE Pstsxis, No. 17, P. so67.
" Verordnung ztr 4bdnderung and Ergdnzung von Vorschriften aul den Gebiete des Arbeitsrechte
(Order amending and supplementing Orders relating to labor law), R. G. BL. pt. I, 3683.
" 1d. i 609.
"First Administrative Orders under the War Economy Decree of Sept. x6, 1939, R. G. 13L. pt. I
1869, and I POSSE ET AL., KOMmENTAR, pt. II, Kriegsldhne nnd -urlaub, 6-11.
"'Decree of Oct. 11, 1939, R. G. BL. pt. 1, 2053; 1 POSSE ET AL., KOmmENTAR 11-13.
"Second Administrative Orders of Oct. 12, 1939, R. G. BL. Pt. I, 2o8; 1 Posse ET AL., 14-20.
"No bonuses may be granted if not granted before Nov. 16, 1939 (1939) REICISAnEiTsBLsrr, pt. I,
544. Interest rates paid by plant savings bank may not be increased. March 8, ,940, (3940) id. 447.
' On performance wage, see BEHEMOa 432-433; on piecework for juveniles, see (1941) .o SozrMAt
PRAXIS 251.
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combines, would have threatened the price structure and, perhaps, even paved the
way for inflation. The ingenious device used by the regime was to lower the
maximum wage if the performance of the worker slackens 4 --so that a minimum
effect of the performance wage may be achieved without abandoning the wage-
freezing policy.
We may add, in this connection, that the War Economy Decree also abolished
the additional payments for overtime, Sunday, holiday and night work, that all
provisions for granting holidays, whether in statutes, wage and plant regulations
or individual agreements, were abolished-but that shortly afterwards all these pro-
visions were restored, with the exception of the additional payments for overtime
for the 9th and the ioth hours 2
This whole policy does not seem to have been very successful. The insignificant
result achieved by the stabilization of wages will not surprise us, if we consider the
social basis of National Socialism. Even the most authoritarian regime, even the
placing of SS men behind each worker, will never achieve a maximum of produc-
tion. The lessons of the coal industry dearly teach that43-as well as the migration
from agriculture to industry which will be discussed below.
To be sure, no quantitative statements can be made as to how far the undoubted
drop in productivity is due to physical exhaustion, to opposition, or to the intro-
duction of over- and under-aged people in the process of production. Yet the
incessant strengthening of the terroristic apparatus makes it likely that the slow-
down is as important a factor as are physical and economic necessities. The War
Economy Decree made it a crime, punishable with imprisonment or even death,
to destroy, damage, take away, or hoard raw material or products if by such acts
the satisfaction of the population's needs is maliciously impaired. The People's
Court had previously ruled that the betrayal of plant secrets may constitute treason to
the country and would be punished by death4 The third administrative order45
extended the penal power of the Trustees who were authorized to mete out unlim-
ited fines without being compelled to go to the criminal courts.
As compared with the power of the Trustees, that of the Labor Courts is really
insignificant.46 Their jurisdiction is limited to disputes between an employer and
his employees or between employees arising from group work. They still have a
'This power was vested in the Trustees in the fall of 1941. See Frankfurter Zeitung, Sept. 28, 1941-
12 See BEHEMOT'H 346-348.
S Production per shift in the Ruhr valley developed as follows: 1932 (depression year), 2093 kilo-
grams; 1936 (Four Year Plan starts), 299 kilograms; 1937, 2054 kilograms; 1938, 197o kilograms
(- %). This occurred in spite of the fact that the number of miners was increased by 2oooo. Even
the total production of coal did not adequately develop. 1932, 104.7 million tons; 1936, 158 million
tons; 1937, 184 million tons (Saar and Austria included); 1938, 186.4 million tons (Saar and Austria
included). See (1939) 48 SOZIALE PRAxIS 395.
" Volksgericht (Peoples' Court), First Senate, April 15, 1937, in (1937) Zrrscsusr IDE AxA lm
FOR DEurrscHts RECHT 410.
" Issued Dec. 2, 1939, R. G. BL. Pt. I, 2370, and i PossE ET AL., KO MENTAR 29-30.
" A very detailed and accurate study has been made by Cole, National Sociaism and the Germarn
Labor Courts (1941) 3 J. OF PoLrncs 169-197.
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rational organization and a rational procedure. But in actual practice, their limited
powers dwindle to almost nothing. For, according to Section xi of the Labor Courts
Act of April io, I934,47 legal representation before the Labor Courts is a monopoly of
the Labor Front. Only employees of the Labor Front normally may appear before
Labor Courts; members of the bar may appear only in exceptional cases if admitted
by the Labor Front. And the Labor Front grants assistance before Labor Courts only
if "the intended law suit is (a) expected to be successful, and (b) does not contra-
dict National Socialist principles and the principles of honor of labor.:'48  Since
these principles change according to political exigencies, it is almost impossible to
say whether a worker or an employer, possessing certain rights, can assert them.40
Even less significant are the Social Honor Courts, 0 intended to punish viola-
tions committed by employers and employees against the honor of labor and of the
plant community spirit.51 They are rarely invoked against employees since the
procedure is costly and cumbersome and since the regime possesses cheaper and
swifter means of terrorization: the concentration camp, the army, the Todt organ-
ization, the People's Courts, the special tribunals. The main purpose of the Social
Honor Courts is to terrorize the small businessman who is often unable to cope
with the terrific amount of regimentation of the labor market and whose punish-
ment is celebrated as proof of the regime's "social consciousness."
2. The Labor Front
Side by side with the state institutions designed to control the labor market, the
Labor Front operates as a mere party organization5 It is neither a trade union
nor a federation of trade unions, nor a corporate body standing above and between
employers and employees. It is rather an inarticulate body comprising all the so-
called "Schaffende" 5 -that is, all persons engaged in work, workers, salaried em-
ployees, free professions, farmers, employers, who are either directly or collectively
affiliated. The Labor Front is divided into "Reichsbetriebsgemeinschaften/" national
plant communities, but these plant communities are not lower organizational units
of which the Labor Front is composed,-the members of the Labor Front are not
47 R. G. BL. Pt. I, 319.
"Rechtsrchutz-Ordnung der Deutschen Arbeitsfront, c. II, reprinted in RomaNo UND SCIMAUT, DIP
A!sEITSGESE-1zz DER GEGENWART (Berlin & Leipzig, 1938) 337-340.
"On the legal aid business of the Labor Front, 4. Werner Hellwig (Director of the Office of Legal
Aid in the Labor Front) (1939) 48 SozIALE Pasxis 769.
" They are very accurately analyzed by Pelcovitz, The Sodal Courts of Honor of Nazi Germany,
(938) 53 POL. ScO. Q. 350-371.
" They are based on §§35-55 of the Charter of Labor.
'The Labor Front is a party organization, under the financial control of the party treasurer, Franz
Schwarz. See BEHEmoTI 80-83. The legislative acts on which its activities are based are: the "Unity
Act" of Dec. x, 1933, R. G. BL. pt. I, ioz6, as amended on July 3, 1934, R. G. BL. pt. 1, 529, and the
administrative order issued under it on March 29, 1935, R. G. BL. Pt. 1, 502, as amended on Dec. 5,
z935, R. G. BL. Pt. 1, 1523, and Jan. 12, 1938, R. G. B.. Pt. I, 36.
" Bestimmungen fber die Zugeh5rigkeit zur Deutschen Arbeitsront, reprinted in Ron"LVNo UND
Sc-uatrr, op. dt. supra note 48, 333-337.
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members of the plant communities 4 but solely of the Labor Front as a whole.
The plant communities are merely administrative departments of the central admin-
istration of the Labbr FrontO5 It is true that ever since 1935 there have existed
institutions integrating the Labor Front and the central business organization, the
National Economic Chamber, established by the foundation of the National Labor
and Economic Council. But this body and its regional and local bases have never
once functioned; in fact the sole purpose of their creation by the so-called Leipzig
agreement"6 was to deprive the Labor Front of its economic activities which were
entrusted to the National Economic Chamber at the top and to the provincial
economic chambers in the middle level.
What then is the Labor Front? It is best to start with what it is not. It is
not a union; it does not fix wages or labor conditions; it is not a state organ and
thus has no control over labor supply. Its purpose, in the words of the Decree of
October 24, 1934, on the Nature and Aim of the Labor Front,57 is "the formation
of a real people's and performance community of all Germans." It is thus an
"educational" institution, a party organ that indoctrinates and terrorizes. All its
economic and social functions are derived from authority granted by the state, such
as its part in enacting wage regulations, in the legal representation before Labor
Courts, in appointing works councils, in checking the remuneration received by
home workers, etc. The Labor Front does not shape policies, it only carries out
one aspect of the regime's labor policy; it manipulates the workers, drives them on,
entices, terrorizes, and indoctrinates them. The role of the Labor Front is best
expressed by the Decree of December 28, 1939, on the Administration in Rural
Units,18 where administration is left to the civil service and the "MenschenfAihrung,"
the manipulation of the masses, to the party. It would be fatally wrong, however,
to underestimate this function, which today is more vital than ever before. In a
period of slackening performance, population mixture, and military strains, where
economic and social necessities forbid the use of economic incentives, the slave
driver is the most important figure in the process of increasing output.
It is this job that the Labor Front performs. It operates through its numerous
bureaucracy, through its Strength Through Joy Department, and through non-
bureaucratic bodies forming elites within the working classes for the purposes of
playing off one small group against the mass and of placing stool-pigeons within
each plant, shop and public administration. These terrorizing agencies are the
" This point is stressed in the authoritative book by WILLY MiLLER, DAs soziss LzBEN IM NMEEN
DEuTrsCHLAND (Berlin, 1938) 86.
"'There are now 16 such plant communities. Compare, on the organization of the Labor Front,
Cole, The Evolution of the German Labor Front (1937) 52 POL. Sc. Q. 532-558, and BEzuMo'rh
413-419 •
to On this agreement of March 21, 1935, between the Leader of the Labor Front and the Ministers
of Labor and Economics, compare Cole, loc. cit. supra note 55, BMa-Imors 46-47, and BRADY, Tim
SPIRIT AND STRcruan OF GEmN FAclsci (New York, 1937) 127-139.
6 Reprinted in RoHLFINO UND ScmAuT, op. cit. supra note 48, 327-329.
to See BEHF.MOs 72.
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Councils of Trusted Men, established on the basis of the Charter of Labor, the
Plant Troops, and the Political Shock Troops."
3. The "Combing-Out Commissions" and the Deputy jor Labor Supply
Yet the machinery consisting primarily of the Minisiry of Labor with its labor
exchanges and its Trustees, on the one hand, and of the Labor Front, on the other,
did not assure a sufficiently streamlined organization for the full control of the labor
market. Two more bodies have been created: "combing-out commissions," appar-
ently in the spring of 194r, and a general deputy for labor supply in the spring
of 1942.
The combing-out commissions0 0 are either national or regional. The former,
composed of representatives of the Reich ministries, investigate big plants; the latter
comprise representatives of the labor exchange, the armed forces (Riistungsl(om-
mandos), the economic offices (Wirtschaftsdmter), and the provincial economic
chambers. Only rarely do they include a Labor Front official-thus revealing the
low regard in which the regime actually holds the Labor Front. The purpose of
the commissions is very well defined by their name. They investigate plants, study
their output, capacity and the necessity for coordination. If they find that a plant
uses labor inadequately or is superfluous in the war effort, the workers are "combed-
out," that is, ordered to leave and to take work elsewhere. The legislative basis will
be discussed later.
The culmination of authoritarian control was reached in the spring of 1942 with
the appointment of a general deputy for labor supply who utilizes on the regional
level the Gauleiter (district leader) of the party. The appointment was made0' on
the authority of the Four-Year-Plan Decree of October 18, 1936.02 The post par-
allels that of a general deputy for the rationalization of German industry created
shortly before. Fritz Sauckel, district leader of Thuringia, was chosen as the new
labor dictator. No better selection could have been made, for Sauckel represents in
his person the major groups of the ruling class: industry, party and bureaucracy.
He is an industrialist of no mean standing who controls the National Socialist
Party's Wilhelm Gustloff Foundation operating six rich industrial firms.p He is
a party district leader and thereby a powerful party hierarch; he is also a high SS
leader (SS Obergruppenfiihrer) and thus belongs to the inner circle of the leader-
ship of the practitioners of violence. He can thus balance the antagonistic forces:
the claim of industry for more foreign workers and that of his boss Heinrich
Himmler, in his capacity of Reich Commissioner for Strengthening Germanism
in the East, for retaining the skilled workers in the East. 4 He has the concentra-
"For a fuller discussion of these institutions, see BEHEMsOTH 422-425, 417-418.
"o See report in the Frankfurter Zeitung, May 18, X941.
"Decree of March 28, 1942, in 6 DER VIERJAm SPLAN (942) I98.
62 R. G. BL. pt. 1, 887. "On the history of this combine, see BznEmal 303-304.
e
4Exemplified by Administrative Order of the Minister of Labor, May 24, 1940, (1940) REIcM-
ABitTsBLA-r, No. 20, Pt. 1, 350, in which the Labor Exchanges are ordered to heed the request of
Himmler for artisans.
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tion camps at his disposal to punish recalcitrants. He is thus superimposed on the
Minister of Labor, Franz Seldte, a nonentity without influence who has been re-
tained merely because German ministers are not makers of policies but simply tools
carrying out the commands of the leadership. The district leaders are superimposed
on the provincial and local labor exchanges.
The institutional framework for the control of labor in Germany proper is thus
complete. We have now to turn to a study of the devices for insuring an adequate
labor supply.
III. DEvicEs FOR AsSURING AN ADEQUATE LABOR SUPPLY
The labor supply situation in 1933, when Hitler came to power, in some ways
facilitated, and in some ways obstructed, the execution of the rearmament program.
The severe unemployment of the depression period6 had created a reserve army
from which millions of workers could be transferred into armament production.
But the depression had also created very serious handicaps. Skill had been neg-
lected, fewer apprentices had been trained, skilled labor had emigrated, especially
from the mines, metallurgical industries, and building construction.
The first tasks were to concentrate labor exchange and to inventory the labor
reserve as well as the working population. The Act of November 5, 1935,66 gave
the Reich Institute exclusive power over labor exchange, vocational guidance, and
the hiring of apprentices. As far as private labor exchange activities were admitted,
they were transformed into agents of the Reich Institute.67
The inventorying of labor was the second step. The existing statistical services,
though much more complete than in the United States, were still inadequate. The
number of employed could be approximately estimated on the basis of the contri-
butions to sickness, invalidity, and salaried employees insurance institutions. Unem-
ployment was known through the statistical services of the Reich Institute and of
the trade unions. A complete survey of available skill and training was lacking.
It was created by the introduction of the work book6 for specific industries, which
was gradually extended until it covered the whole population with minor excep-
tions. 6  The book contains a full vocational record, listing the training, special-
ization, beginning and end of each employment period, and, in addition, data
on air pilot licenses and familiarity with agricultural work. The book has to be
handed over to the employer who makes the necessary entries. It is issued to the
employee by the labor exchange which transfers the entries on cards. As early as
the fall of 1936, 22 million books had been issued and the extension in 1939 necessi-
" Registered unemployed in January 1932: 6.042 million; to this must be added an unknown number
of "invisible unemployed," estimated at about 2 million. See BEHEmOTH 475.
6 R. G. BL. Pt. I, 128r.
" Administrative Order of Nov. 26, 1936. R. G. BL. pt. I, 13o.
0 Act of Feb. 26, 1935, R. G. BL. pt. 1, 311.
e Decree of April 22, 1939, reprinted in F. Symup, DER AREEII-ssISAIz IsM VIERYAmmwSDLAN (Berlin-
Vienna-Leipzig, 1940) 120-130.
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tated the issuance of an additional 14 million books; 8.5 million were issued on
June 30, 1941.70
i. The Major Acts and Decrees
The best way to present the rather complicated legislative development is first
to survey the major enactments.71 We mention the following:
i. The Act of May 15, 1934, for the Regulation of Labor Supply,72 as amended
February 25, 1935,73 of which the main provisions authorize
(a) prohibition of the employment of persons not domiciled in the region of their
prospective employment;
(b) measures to fight the depletion of agricultural labor supply.
2. The Decree of August io, 1934, for the Distribution of Labor Power74 vests the
total power of allocation and exchange of labor in the president of the Reich Institute.
3. The Seven Decrees of November 7, I936,7r dealing with
(a) securing an adequate supply of skilled labor in the new generation;
(b) securing an adequate supply of metalworkers for politically important tasks;
(c) reintroducing metal and building workers into their previous trades;
(d) registering building construction projects before commencement of construction;
(e) reemploying older salaried employees (of 4o years and more);
(f) forbidding the use of code in "help wanted" advertisements;7"
(g) granting employers in the metal industry, in building construction, in the brick
industry, and in agriculture, the right to retain the work books of workers who
leave their positions before the end of the notification period.
4. The Decrees of February 15,7 and December 23, 1938,7s dealing with agricul-
ural labor and housework;
5. The registration on March i, 1938, of students about to leave school;70
6. The basic Decree of February 13, 1939,80 establishing conscription of labor and
70 Beisiegel, Labor Redistribuion in Germany (1942) 45 INT. LAB. Rev. No. 4, PP. 395-401. The
writer is a high official in the Reich Institute, and his article is a translation of his paper in the
"Reichsarbeitsblatt."
' Problems of labor time, relief legislation and unemployment support will not be discussed here
in this article. Extended discussion of women's labor is also omitted. Cf. BEHE aoriO 341. The num-
ber of employed women in 1933 was 4,700,000, in 1938, 6,3oo,ooo, and in January, 1941, 9,400,000.
The 2,000,000 added since 1938 came primarily from household work. According to the Census of
1939, supra note 9, there were 21.7 million women without occupation, among whom were ii million
children below fourteen years of age, so that about ix million could work. Since the majority is
urgently needed for household work, there was in January, 1941, a possible reserve of between 2 and 3
million women. (1941) 2o DiE WxRrsc:us'rsxsRvE, No. 2, pp. 148-i5o. The figures do not say much,
since apparently even children are being mobilized.
7 2 R. G. BL. Pt. 1, 311.
7
rd. 310. 74 1d. 786.
(x936) DEurscnEs REiCHSANZEiGER, No. 262, p. I. For this analysis, the author draws on the
commentary in SRtup, op. cit. supra note 69.
"on Dec. 13, 1940, the Minister of Labor prohibited the use of the press and the radio for "help
wanted" ads. (1940) RmCHsARBEiTsrLA-rr, Nos. 25-36, pt. I, 6x5.
T (x938) DEuTsciRe RElCsSAssZEIGER, No. 43. 751d. No. 305.
7 Id. No. 5z. 8 R. G. BL. Pt. 1, 206.
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restricting the change of employment for certain professions, implemented by ad-
ministrative orders of March 2 (amended July 27),' March IO,82 and July II, I939;13
7. Upon the outbreak of war, the Decree of September x, 1939, of the Ministerial
Council for the Defense of the Reich.84
2. The Apprentice Problem
The most serious aspect of Germany's labor supply problem was and still is the
lack of a new generation of skilled labor, especially of apprentices. The following
table elucidates the gravity of the problem.
7tveniles Apprentice
Year leaving school Year posions open
1934 ........................... 62o,ooo 1933-4 ......................... 155,675
1935 ........................... 62oooo 1934-5 ......................... 21I,790
1936 ........................... 580,000 1935-6 ......................... 282,290
1937 ........................... 565,000 1936-7 ......................... 365,858
1938 ........................... 550,000 1937-8 ......................... 441,356
1939 ........................... 555,000 1938-9 ......................... 582,600
1940 ........................... 550,000
1941 ........................... 530,000
x942 ........................... 525,000
1947 ........................... 444,000
Source: Stets, Zur Nachwuchsplanung 194z (94o) REicH&ARasTsarvrr, No. 28, pt. V, 482.
The change in the conception of the apprenticeship contract has not increased
the apprentice supply; on the contrary, it has decreased it. Under the Weimar
Republic, courts and collective agreements had considered the apprenticeship con-
tract not only as an educational agreement but as a genuine labor contract, giving
the apprentice all the rights that workers possessed. This achievement was destroyed
by National Socialism. The apprentice is no longer considered a worker; his con-
tract is now exclusively an "educational and training agreement."'
To overcome the scarcity of apprentices, a number of measures have been intro-
duced. Their training period had gradually been shortened until the decree of
March 7, 194o s' prohibited any extension beyond three years 7 Decree No. 5 of
March 1, 1938, compelled all students up to 21 years of age leaving elementary,
middle, and high schools to register two weeks before graduation with the labor
exchange, 8 while Decree No. 3a of November 7, 1936, had already compelled plants
31Id. 403, 1330. Id. 444.
"Id. 12x6. 5 41d. 1685.
" See survey by Theodor Rohlfing, Wandlungen im Lehrverhltnis, in ZErn JxmRE ARaEITsoEuRcHT
(Berlin & Leipzig, 1937) 94-104. On the consequences of this change, see BEnH_.4TH 432-433.
"' R. G. BL. Pt. 1, 478; see (r940) 49 SOZMALE PaRXIs, No. 7, P. 200.
ay How serious this step is may be gathered from statistics showing the average length of the training
period: Of 59o industrial trades, 103 had four years training, 4 had 3 z years, and 83 had 3 years. Of
3 handicraft trades, 15 had 4 years training, 2 had 3% years, and 14 had 3 years. W. Riihmann,
Drei jahre Lehrzeit (1938) 47 SozstALE PRAXIs, No. 23, p. 1427.
"' The form is printed in S ,Rup, op. cit. supra note 69, at 87d-87e.
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in the iron and steel industries and in building construction with ten and more
employed to hire an adequate number of apprentices89
3. The Agricultural Labor Problem
The agricultural situation, too, presented grave difficulties. Statistics show a
considerable decline of the agricultural population (by io.6% from 1933 to 1939)
and the "Landflucht"--the flight from agriculture-continues steadily as is shown
in No. 17 of the Soziale Praxis of 1941 which is exclusively devoted to a discussion
of this problem. The flight from the countryside clearly demonstrates the collapse
of the "blood and soil" ideology or, more accurately, it results from this policy.
For the Hereditary Estates Act which leaves the farm unencumbered to one off-
spring only, drives the younger sons into industrial work. This, however, is not
the sole cause. When National Socialists do not talk propaganda, they are usually
intensely realistic and never deceive themselves. They admit that the primary cause
of Landflucht is the lower wage scale of agricultural workers who are partly paid
in kind (Deputat). The investigation carried out by the Labor Front's Institute
for the Science of Labor shows that the German people have no prejudice against
the countryside as such, since workers do not migrate from industries located far
away from big cities, but that Landflucht occurs exclusively among agricultural
labor and is caused by the inadequacy of agricultural wages.0
Aside from the introduction of foreign civilian labor and war prisoners, the
r~gime attempted to remedy the situation by the following measures: Act No. i of
May 15, 1934, and amended February 25, 1935, gives the president of the Reich
Institute the authority to order the dismissal of agricultural workers now employed
in other trades; Decree No. 3g (of November 7, x936) makes it impossible for
agricultural laborers to leave their jobs before the expiration of the dismissal period;
Decrees No. 4a and 4b of February 15, 1938, and December 23, x938, prohibit the
employment of unmarried females below 25 years of age unless they can prove by
their work book that they have worked at least one year in agriculture or in a
household (Pflichtjahr)Y' The Pflichtjahr is, however, not the only institution which
comprehensively introduces labor into agricultural work. We have to add the
Erntehilfe (harvest help) under the auspices of the Hitler Youth for students of
io and more years of age; the Landjahr (agricultural year) for juveniles who are
being selected jointly by their school, doctor, labor exchange, national socialist wel-
fare organization and Hider Youth; the Landdienst (agricultural service) for the
re-introduction of urban youth into rural life, organized by the Hider Youth;
0 2
the hauswirtschaftliche Jahr (household year) for female juveniles introduced in
"' Sections 8-io of the Reichsschulpflichtgesetz of July 6, 1938, R. G. BL. pt. 1, 799, fixed the com-
pulsory attendance at trade schools at 3 years and, for agricultural apprentices, at 2 years.
"0s JAHRBUcH 1939 (edited by the Arbeitswissenschajliche Inslitut der Arbeitsfront) 389-414, esp.
404-407.
"I1lse Richter, Pflichtiahr ffir M cdhen (194o) REicssARerrsBLAtrr, No. 26, Pt. V, 456.
921938-27,000 juveniles; 194o--8,400 juveniles. See Landeinsatz der deutschen Jugend (x945)
50 SozIALE PiAms No. 17, p. 673.
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1934 by an agreement between the woman's organization and the Hitler Youth,
intended to train "household apprentices" who have to work in households, work
which evokes no enthusiasm since the "apprentices" receive no wages except a little
pocket moneyP3  The deterioration of the health of the juveniles must be serious
since it is admitted that the average age of the agricultural service boys and girls
is steadily dropping. 4
4. Metal Industries and Building Trades
Similar problems existed in the metal industries and in the building trades, and
later developed in mining. Decree No. 3 b of November 7, 1936, tried to solve the
difficulty in the following manner. The additional employment of ten and more
metal workers95 was made dependent upon the consent of the labor exchanges
which could grant it only if the work was deemed to be necessary for rearmament.
Decree No. 3c of November 7, 1936, applied to metal and building workers. It
ordered employers to inform the labor exchange whether they employed metal and
building workers not actually working in their trade. The labor exchange had
then to arrange for a transfer of such workers into their trades. Decree No. 3 d of
the same date90 made it compulsory for private and public building contractors to
register building projects above a certain size with the labor exchanges before start-
ing construction.
5. Labor Freezing and Conscription
Apart from the three special problems of labor supply (apprentices, agricultural
and metal and construction work) the general problem of allocating labor had to
be solved. Decree 3e of November 7, 1936, compelled plants and public authorities
with ten and more salaried employees to employ an adequate number of older
salaried employees and to inform the labor exchange of the number of employed
white-collar workers? The basic problems, however, were the complete abolition
of the freedom to hire and fire and the conscription of labor. Decree No. 6 of
February 13, 1939, partially solved the first problem. Section II gave the Minister
of Labor the right to make the dissolution of labor contracts dependent upon the
consent of the labor exchanges. The Minister exercised his right for the following
industries: agriculture, forestry, mining (excepting coal mining), chemicals, build-
ing materials, iron and metals. Shortly afterwards, coal mining was included. The
same decree also authorized him to enact legislation making the hiring of labor
dependent upon the labor exchange's permission.
This trend culminated in the war decree (No. 7 of September I, 1939) which
"Else Lfiders, Die Dienstpflicht der Frau (1938) id. 47, No. 22, p. 1347; in 1934 there were 300o
household apprentices; in 1935, 12,000; and in 1936, 1o,ooo.
" (1941) 50 id. No. 17, p. 673.
" For exact definition of "metal industry," see SiRu, op. cit. supra note 69, at 44-47.
" As amended on July 23, 1937. See id. at 62.
07 Compare the administrative orders of April 15, 1937, elaborating the procedure and supplying
data on the numbers involved. See SiRu, op. cit. supra note 69, at 77a-77d.
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forbade the dissolution of any kind of labor contract without the consent of the
labor exchange and equally allowed the hiring of labor only with the exchange's
express permission. Exempted from this latter provision were only agricultural
enterprise and mines"s and households with children below 14 years of age. The
decree of May 2o, i942, finally, vested the right to dissolve a labor contract exclusively
in the labor exchanges. The development is thus complete.
The counterpart to the freezing of labor to its place is the introduction of labor
conscription by Decree No. 6 of February 13, 1939, which replaced that of June 22,
1938. It created the Dienstpflicht, compulsory labor. The labor exchange may con-
script "inhabitants of the Reich territory." Aliens are exempt only if international
treaties or "recognized rules of international law" provide for such exemptions.
Two such types of conscription are distinguished: short-term and long-term service.
In the first case, the employer of a conscripted worker has to grant him leave of
absence. The labor contract thus does not lapse. In the second case, the old labor
contract ceases. In both cases, however, the work of the conscripted worker is
carried out on the basis of a labor contract, that is, the moment the labor exchange
summons someone to take up work in a plant, a labor contract is considered as
having been concluded so that all wage and plant regulations apply to conscripted
labor.9" Conscripted workers who are compelled to establish a second household,
receive a Trennungszulage (separation bonus) of up to 19 marks a week,100 while
other regulations provide for support in atypical cases of hardship.
The number of conscripted workers, however, has never been very great. From
June 1939 to June 1940, 1,75oooo conscription orders were issued, 1,5ooooo for men,
25o,ooo for women. From the outbreak of the war to the end of June, 1940, only
9oo,ooo short-term conscriptions were issued,101 while in June, i94o, 35oooo persons
and in I94i, 437,ooo men and i74,ooo women 02 were actually conscripted.
Quite a different problem was solved by the Notdienstverordntng, the Emer-
gency Service Decree of October 15, i938P3 While labor conscription aims at
introducing labor into productive work, the emergency service decree provides
labor for meeting public emergencies, such as fire, floods, air raid damages, etc.
The tasks are thus "hoheitlich," as German administrative law calls them; they
fall in the province of the police. In such emergencies, "inhabitants of the Reich
territories" may be summoned to work. Exempt are members of the armed forces,
"'On mines, see ist Administrative Order of Sept. 6, x939, R. G. BL. pt. I, i69o; i PossE FT AL.,
KomEsA,'A, pt. 1, Arbetsplatzwechsel, 14.
"The rst Administrative Order of March 2, 1939, and July 27, 1939, R. G. BL. pt. I, 403, 1330,
contains detailed regulations. See also comments in I POSSE r AL., KOMMENTAR 11-27.
... Administrative Order of Sept. 4, 1939, DEUTrscHaa RmcHSANZErOEE, No. 207, and x Posse Er AL.,
KomENTArr., 28-66, where the numerous detailed provisions are printed. The order applies also to
cases where workers are transferred due to a shut-down of a plant. See Decree of March 21, 1940,
R. G. BL. Pt. I, 544.
.0. (1940) 49 SoziALE PRAXis, No. 17, 543. 102 Beisiegel, stupra note 21, at 396.
...R. G. BL. pt. 1, 1441. The discussion here follows I PossE FT AL., KOMMENTAR, pt. I, Notdienst,
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the labor service, the custom guards, the police, the "troops at disposal" and the
"death-head formations" of the SS, 04 and some groups in the air raid service. The
emergency service is again either a short-term or long-term service. But-in con-
trast to conscripted labor-it is carried out not on the basis of private but of public
law. No labor contract exists between the emergency service worker and his em-
ployer. Hence, he receives no wages but support, which is graded according to the
income of the emergency service worker °5 and an equally graded indemnification
for clothing, food and shelter.10 The notice of July 8, 1939,107 designates the offi-
cials who are permitted to request such emergency services. A report of the Frank-
furter Zeitung'0s---if I am able to interpret it correctly-shows, however, that the
Emergency Service Decree is misused for purposes completely alien to its nature.
A new regulation orders especially the offices of the armed forces, of public admin-
istration, and of hospitals to dismiss their male personnel and to employ juvenile
women workers. The order adds that these girls do not work under a labor con-
tract, that they need not possess work books, and that their marriage is dependent
upon consent of the authorities which-so it is added-will be rarely granted.
IV. THE USE OF ALIEN LABOR AND WAR PRIsoNERs
It has already been indicated that the mobilization of aliens plays a considerable
role in the solution of Germany's difficulties. Three different problems must be
distinguished: (I) The importation of foreign civilian labor into the German Reich,
partly on the basis of international agreements (i.e., Italy) and partly through con-
scription, that is, brute force (i., Poland); (2) the utilization of war prisoners;
and (3) the utilization of labor outside the German territory, that is, in the con-
quered lands. The three problems must not be confused. The ideological basis of
the work by non-Germans is the new conception of international law which has
done away with equality and protection of minorities and replaced them by the
concept of the "folk group" which allows the German master to differentiate finely
among the various national groups so as to give some more, some less, some no
rights whatsoever 0 9  The hierarchy is as follows: Jews; Poles; Ukrainians and
Croats, Lithuanians, Estonians, Latvians, Czechs, French, Dutch, and Scandinavians;
Slovaks; racial Germans without German citizenship; Germans. The hierarchy
may change according to political exigencies and has indeed changed, as will be
seen below.
I. The Importation of Foreign Labor
Within Germany all these groups work. They work on the basis of labor con-
tracts and thus come under the provisions of German labor law and of the wage
1"I On these SS groups, see BEx-mom-s 69-70.
10  See the table in x PossE mT AL.., KoisiENwesat ash.
1"8 Order of the Minister of the Interior of Oct. 13, 1939 and May 28, 1940, 1 PossE Er AL., KoM-
MENTAR 38-43.
o
7 R. G. BL. Pt. 1, 1204, and 1 PossE ET AL., KOMMENTAR 12.
" Frankfurter Zeitung, Aug. 17, 1941. ' Cf. BEHEMOTH i6o-I7a, 125-127.
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and plant regulations, with certain exceptions. Jews are-in violation of the racial
theory--drafted and work under labor contracts. They are nevertheless subject to
special restrictions. The Reich Supreme Labor Court had already ruled that Jews
cannot become members of the "plant community,"'10 and a ruling of the Minister
of Labor clarified their legal position,"' drawing the consequences from their ex-
clusion from the plant community. They may not be appointed foremen, and do
not receive wages on holidays (Mayday, New Year, Christmas, etc.). They are not
entitled to family allowances, nor to pregnancy bonuses, nor may they receive dis-
missal indemnities and separation bonuses 1 2 if their wages are high enough. They
cannot get Christmas or other bonuses, nor have they the right to demand wages
in case of air raid alarm. Only once a year may they go home to their families.
They are subject-as are the Poles-to a Sozialausgleichabgabe, a special additional
tax of x5%/ of the wage exceeding 39 marks monthly."8
This treatment meted out to Jews and Poles has, however, been extended in the
spring of 1942 to all "folk groups" in the territory of the Generalgotvernement
(occupied Poland). The preferential treatment of the Lithuanians, Latvians,
Estonians and Ukrainians has ceased. They are now also subject to the 15%/. tax
and are placed-whatever their training and skill may be-in the lowest wage class
of their age and occupational group. Also all the other regulations applied to Jews
are now applied to them. Only in one instance is their treatment better. They
are taxed according to the size of their families whereas in the case of the Poles no
such consideration is shown." 4
Even this limited amount of rights is not applied to the inhabitants of occupied
Russia. To Russians German labor law does not apply, even if they work inside
Germany. The sole protection that the Minister of Labor found necessary to enact
in their behalf was that deductions from their wages should be made in such a way
that the workers retain, if possible, 20 Pfennigs per working day as pocket money,
Jews have to wear the Star of David, Poles a P, and Russians an 0 (meaning Ost-
East) on their sleeves. In order to counteract any sentimental feelings that decent
German employers or civil servants may have toward these slaves, the Minister
of Labor added: "It is the duty of the labor commissioner to watch that these
workers are not, directly or indirectly, granted better working conditions then pre-
scribed by the existing regulations." 16
2. The Utilization of War Prisoners
The work of war prisoners does not come under the provisions of German labor
law. It is slave labor pure and simple. Wages that have to be paid so as not to
0 judgment of July 24, 1940 (1940) DEuTScnE Jusnz, No. 37, 1035-
... Dr. Hans Kiippers, Die vorlutfige arbeitsrechtliche Behandlung der luden (94) REMCSA3EiTs-
miA-r, No. 6, pt. V, io6.
2:2 Ibid.
'"
5 Decree of Dec. 24, 194o, R. G. BL. pt. I, 1666; (1940) REiCHSAREi'sBL.ATr, No. 24, pt. 1, 446.
"' Order C III b, 3972/42 of Feb. 27, 1942, reprinted in I. T. F. BEu.., No. 9, Fascism, May 4, 1942.
:ta51bid. 2ta6 Ibid.
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prefer one entrepreneur to another, are paid to the Stalag, the administration of the
war prisoners camps. According to a ruling of the Minister of Labor 17 war prison-
ers shall be employed in the following occupations and, if possible, in the following
sequence: agriculture; melioriation; mining; railroad track work; construction and
operation in synthetic rubber; hydrogenation and cellulose wool plants; roads and
canals; brick factories and quarries; stable construction; turf work; transportation.
Special labor exchange offices have been set up to find out the amount of skilled
labor that is available. s
In spite of the political dangers involved, even Russian War prisoners have been
set to work in Germany.
3. The Utilization of Labor in Occupied Countries
It is impossible to adequately describe the varied labor regulations prevailing in
the occupied territories. They differ from country to country. In Poland and
Russia they are plain slavery regulations, while in other parts of Europe attempts
are still being made to establish Fascist- and German-dominated unions or labor
fronts that help to enslave the working classes. The Bulletin of the Inter-
national Transport Workers Federation on "Fascism" provides reliable material in
abundance."
V. FuruR TRENDS
We have by no means covered the whole territory. Nothing has been said about
the development of wages and the material and non-material gratification that the
working class received. I have to refer the reader to my book and to a future study
of these problems. It may suffice here to indicate the major trends in broad strokes.
Wages have, as a rule, been stabilized on the depression level while in many cases
(building construction) reductions have been made. Earnings have increased as a
result of longer hours of toil-as National Socialists themselves admit. Deductions
for taxes, contributions to social insurance institutions, Labor Front, party, and
winter help average at least 26%, probably more.' 2  Prices of consumption goods
have slowly but steadily risen; compulsory saving has been introduced; accidents
rise and physical exhaustion has begun to show. Income from wages and salaries
fell steadily as compared with income from other sources.
A study of National Socialism reveals the picture of a terrorized, fully exploited
working class. Had we the space, we could show by a number of instances that
even the complete terrorization of the working classes by state and party has not
227 (1940) REICH&SRBEITSBLATT, NO. 21, Pt. I, 384.
"
8 ld. 530, and H5lk, Der Ein.catz von Kriegsgefangenen in Arbeitsstellen (1940) PEiCHSABEE1TsBLA-r,
NO. zi, pt. V, 353.
... The main lines of this policy are described in BEHE MOTH 171-183, and by Ernest Hediger, Nazi
Exploitation of Occupied Europe, FOREIGN POLICY REP., June I, 1942, which also contains an excellent
bibliography.
120 On wages, see (1940) 49 Sozta.E PRAxis, No. 7, 223; on earnings, see (1940) RmxcHsBETsaBLArr,
No. 30, Pt. V, 530; on deductions, see Charlotte Lorenz, Verbrauchs-Haushalt and 5ffentlicher Haushalt
(1938) 47 SOZIALE Plaimts, No. 19, X197,
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succeeded in completely suspending the laws of the labor market. The decline of
production in coal mining and the subsequent legislation to increase productivity;
121
the migration from agriculture; the abolition of holidays, of overtime, night and
holiday bonuses and their subsequent reintroduction;12' Hitler's blast at the "ac-
quired rights" of the German workers in his last speech and the appointment of
Sauckel; innumerable devices of employers to improve the conditions of their work-
ers-they all demonstrate that authoritarian control of the labor market, even where
the means of violence are fully centralized, does not produce the best results. A
democracy will not follow this course-for reasons both ideological and materialistic.
A number of probable consequences must be mentioned to round off the picture.
The aims of National Socialism are clear. Dr. Friedrich Syrup, the former presi-
dent of the Reich Institute and Secretary of State in the Labor Ministry, has frankly
stated them: de-industrialization of the occupied territories and concentration of
industrial production in Germany. The millions of workers from occupied Europe
will have to continue to work for Germany. But-so Dr. Syrup insists-this
"migration must not lead to a settlement of foreigners, to an unnatural mixing of
European peoples and races." Therefore, the foreign workers must be separated
from their families and see them only occasionally.1 3
The future New Order is thus nothing but the perpetuation of war conditions
on a much larger scale. It is an order of slavery, tyranny and brutality. It is im-
possible to express in words the sufferings and the heroism of the exploited peoples.
One day this system will be destroyed from without and within. Will it be
followed by a new nationalism? Will the outcome of the National Socialist New
Order be a return to 19th-century nationalism? We believe the very opposite.
Nationalism is in decay. The exploitation of the masses in Germany and Europe
is not merely the work of the German ruling groups, of the party, army, big busi-
ness and the high bureaucracy. Native capitalists, landowners and Fascists share
the guilt and the spoils. Considerable sections of the native ruling classes have
made their peace with the German conqueror and have even actively helped the
conquest. The masses in Europe know that their terrorization is European and not
merely German.
There is a second factor. The mass migration of foreign workers into Germany
creates an entirely new political and psychological situation. Common work and
common exploitation creates solidarity. Fraternization is frequent, partly out of
pity, partly for political reasons, and the draconic punishment meted out for it
merely illustrates the dread of the German conqueror before the common power
of the European working classes.
"'1 See BEHEOTI 344-345. ... Id. 346-348.
123 (1941) RE CA IBErrsLArr, July 15, quoted from I. T. F. BuLL. No. 16, Fadcsm, Aug. 5, 1941.
